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The world is abuzz with the OpenSSL "heartbleed" bug and the ColdFusion community has also been going 'round about it too.  Firstly, a server (like Apache, Nginx, Tomcat, etc) can be exploited by a client on a hackers machine requesting an SSL connection.  In addition, a client (CURL, wget, CFHTTP, etc) can be exploited if connecting to a malicious SSL endpoint.  So basically, the bug has the ability to flow both ways. 

For most CF sites, they are using IIS, Apache, or Nginx to serve content so ColdFusion has no bearing on the vulnerability from that end.  Any CFML application, however, can connect to a malicious SSL endpoint.  Of course, it only matters if the OpenSSL library is specifically being used.  Any other SSL implementation is safe.

To date, neither Adobe or Railo have yet to make public announcements via security bulletins or their official blog.

UPDATE April 17: Railo responds here.

UPDATE April 18: Adobe responds here:

There have been a handful of less "official" conversations in mailing lists and Twitter.  As best I can tell, neither Adobe ColdFusion or Railo use OpenSSL and therefore are safe.  Of course, any other parts of your web stack (even bundled libraries) might use OpenSSL.  Gert from Railo has promised a blog entry "soon" to address the issue regarding Railo.  There has been some complaining about the lack of official word from Adobe, and my understanding is that the ColdFusion team's hands are tied by the Adobe PSIRT who are the only ones allowed to comment publicly on security matters.

 The general consensus is they could certainly say something, even if it was simply, "Hey, we're looking into it and will get back to you soon".  That as it is, I E-mailed Adobe's PSIRT myself and got a reply that seems as close to an official reply as they are willing to provide at this point though I'm unclear why they're talking about it one-on-one but refraining from public statements.  For the sake of those who haven't E-mailed PSIRT, I will post their reply here for the benifit of the community until something official comes out.  Also, for funsies, I'll post my original E-mail plus my followup.  If I hear back again, I'll update this post.

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From: Brad Wood
To: [email protected]
Date: Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 5:45 AM
Subject: Adobe ColdFusion and Heartbleed

Dear Adobe PSIRT team, 

 

I would like to encourage you to please make a public announcement regarding Adobe ColdFusion and if it is vulnerable to the latest OpenSSL "heartbleed" bug. This is a very significant bug that has people around the world scrambling to patch their software.  Even if Adobe ColdFusion is not susceptible to the recent "heartbleed" bug I would strongly suggest making an announcement on your blog to state that or authorize the ColdFusion team to do so on their blog. 

 

Many people in the CF community have noticed the silence on this issue and an official announcement really needs to be made in order for your customers to feel safe and to verify with their employers that they have all the patches they need.  Communication is very important and I hate to see the Adobe ColdFusion team getting beat up for not addressing this issue publicly on their blog.  Please authorize them to make some kind of statement on this.

 

Thanks!

 

~Brad

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From: [email protected]
To: Brad Wood
Date: Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 1:39 PM
Subject: RE: Adobe ColdFusion and Heartbleed

Hello Brad,

 

Thank you for contacting us.  We appreciate your feedback.  Please note that ColdFusion does not use OpenSSL. However, customers who are using an external web server with their ColdFusion deployment (ex. Apache) should test for CVE-2014-0160. If affected, customers should follow the recommendations provided in the OpenSSL security advisory, available at https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140407.txt. Adobe

also recommends consulting the ColdFusion lockdown guides for security best practices:

https://www.adobe.com/content/dam/Adobe/en/products/coldfusion-enterprise/pdf/cf10-lockdown-guide.pdf

http://www.adobe.com/content/dam/Adobe/en/products/coldfusion/pdfs/91025512-cf9-lockdownguide-wp-ue.pdf

 

We hope this information is helpful.  Please let us know if you have additional questions.

 

Thank you,

Adobe Product Security Incident Response Team

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From: Brad Wood
To: [email protected]
Date: Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 3:13 PM
Subject: Adobe ColdFusion and Heartbleed

Dear PSIRT Team, 

 

Thanks for the reply.  I appreciate the links and concern.  Let me be very clear though-- I am not asking about this for the sake of my servers, I am letting you know that Adobe needs to make a public official statement on the matter for the entire community to see.  Even if your blog entry said nothing more than what you put in your E-mail reply that would be great-- but the community has noticed the lack of public response by Adobe to this matter and it's reflecting quite poorly on your PR.

 

If the PSIRT team doesn't have time to make a quick announcement, please authorize the ColdFusion team to put out a blog post.  This would do a lot for the community as silence breeds distrust and most every other major technology stack have already addressed their platform publicly-- even if just to say they are not vulnerable.

 

Thanks!

 

~Brad

 

UPDATE April 18:

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From: Brad Wood
To: [email protected]
Date: Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 9:50 PM
Subject: Adobe ColdFusion and Heartbleed

Dear PSIRT team,

 

Can you please respond to the comments on my blog made by a community member named "Aaron".  He has listed several binaries that ship with ColdFusion that supposedly use OpenSSL.  His comments can be found here:

 

http://www.codersrevolution.com/blog/adobe-product-security-incident-response-team-on-coldfusion-and-heartbleed#comment_798

 

Also, if you haven't seen it-- here is the official response from the Railo team (a competitor of Adobe CF) which categorically addresses the uses of SSL inside Railo server.

 

http://blog.getrailo.com/post.cfm/railo-server-and-the-heartbleed-vulnerability

 

Thanks!

 

~Brad

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From: [email protected]
To: Brad Wood
Date:  Fri, Apr 18, 2014 at 2:58 PM
Subject: Adobe ColdFusion and Heartbleed

Hi Brad,

Thanks to you and Aaron for bringing this to our attention.  With your input, we started a deeper investigation of ColdFusion components.  We have also clarified our blog post regarding OpenSSL in ColdFusion (http://blogs.adobe.com/psirt/?p=1085).  Should additional information arise from our investigation we'll provide an update to our blog.

 

Thank you again for your help,

Adobe Product Security Incident Response Team

The next stop on our PCI DSS Compliance tour is disabling weak SSL versions and encryption ciphers. If your site is handling credit card payments, it is undoubtedly using HTTPS for at least the pages that collect payment information. I thought I had already taken care of this item, but I was apparently mistaken. Fortunately, this is pretty easy to fix and if you're on Windows I've even cooked up a quick and easy registry file for you to use.

A lot of you have web servers that double as mail servers to relay out mail from your ColdFusion applications. Even if you have a separate server that handles your mail relay, this post should still be helpful. The more and more that spam proliferates on the Internet, the more antsy ISPs get about blocking mail. There are a litany of reasons an ISP might reject mail from your server. GoDaddy has been one of the most annoying companies to deal with. There are two things I had to fix on my mail server before they would accept mail from my server. Reverse DNS and Helo host name.

Some time ago GoDaddy manged to get the IP address of my VPS in their little black book and began refusing to receive any mail which originated from it. Unfortunately for me, I use GoDaddy for my E-mail hosting and that meant I stopped getting all E-mails that were sent from my server. A couple weeks ago I got around to calling them to see just what was going on. I would rather mud-wrestle a large sea-sick crocodile before repeating this tedious conversation with their bumbling excuse for tech support. Here are the details of my correspondence with them.

When you think of your production servers, you need to imagine them as your car sporting a new stereo in a parking lot with a bunch of would-be burglars milling around outside constantly checking each window and door to make sure you locked it tightly the last time you had it open. Every door, window, or keyless entry system is a potential point of invasion that can fail you. Why do you think those brinks trucks have no windows and the only way in the back is a single, beefy, padlocked door. A Brinks truck may not be convenient to access, but that isn't their goal. You need to control the ways into your server with the same gusto.

If you are using Windows, chances are you find yourself remoting into one server or another on a regular basis to start and stop services or to take a gander at the event logs to figure out why the box mysteriously rebooted the other day at 2 am. You may not realize it, but you can access anything in the Computer Management console for your servers without ever remoting into them. This includes, users/groups, IIS, SQL Server, and device manager.

I am not just a programmer, but to some extent a sys admin. Because of that responsibility (and the fact I have had servers compromised before) I am always interested in security. I think to stop crackers; you've got to think like them. When was the last time you tried to hack into your own server? If you don't know what your vulnerabilities are, how can you close them?

So, I assume you've heard the latest buzz about DNS Cache Poisoning and the subsequently released patches. It's rather interesting, and a bit unnerving that the "patch" for now simply makes the exploit harder to pull off-- not impossible. I guess that's basically because the patch simply makes name server requests more randomized. Anything more would require an overhaul to the DNS protocol itself.